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NOTES
complicates the issue of this case but adds to the confusion
prevalent under the Clayton Act generally. The rule was first
employed by the court under the Sherman Act. 22 One of the
objectives of the Clayton Act was to supplement this act with
prohibitions of practices not specifically condemned under prior
anti-trust legislation. Thus the application of the rule of rea-
son defeats the legislative attempt unconditionally to prohibit
these practices. 23 If the lessening of competition must be such
as injuriously to affect the public, then the interpretation of the
expression is entirely different from that employed by the Com-
mission. The Commission is equipped to apply interpretation
based on statistics of sales and business practice. There can be
no efficient action by the Commission on the vague and perplex-
ing question of public interest, for this question cannot be an-
swered solely on a consideration of all the facts, but must in-
clude a consideration of circumstances not within the provisions
of the statute. The statute declares the public interest so far as
the Commission is concerned and it is empowered to determine
only the fact of a violation and to base its order on such fact.
If the court adopts a construction which the Commission can-
not follow, the benefits of administrative action are lost. For
judicial review in this event amounts to a rehearing of the case
before the court.
The International Shoe Company case, through its application
of the doctrine that the transaction must be prejudicial to the
public to constitute a violation of the statute, and through its
exercise of unlimited power of review, not only usurps the Com-
mission's fact-finding power, but practically negatives the effect
of section 7. The case may be considered as expressing the judi-
cial view that sound policy requires the recognition of the in-
dustrial trend. So regarded it is a doubtful policy in the face of
the declared legislative view to the contrary.
THOMAS G. JEFFREY, '31.
THE JUVENILE COURT AS A POSSIBLE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE BODY
The possibility of dealing with juvenile delinquency and de-
pendency by administrative action may seem a far cry, but it is
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 60, ". . . it was
intended that the standard of reason which had applied at the common law
and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by
the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of de-
termining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided."
" See Swift and Co. v. Fed. Trade Com., supra note 9.
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no more of a departure from the present system of juvenile courts
than was the present system from the formal criminal procedure.
To understand this first transition is to contemplate with grow-
ing interest the possible transition from court to administrative
body.
The formal process of a juvenile court proceeding is begun by
the filing of a petition. This, considering Missouri as an ex-
ample, contains a simple statement of facts bringing the child
within the statutory definition of dependency or delinquency.
In St. Louis it is always filed by the probation officer, but in
many jurisdictions it may be filed by any reputable citizen hav-
ing knowledge of the circumstances. The petition need not have
the particularity of a criminal information and is generally not
called an information as it would be in a criminal case.1 An at-
tempted statement of facts though obviously demurrable for in-
sufficiency confers jurisdiction on the court sufficient to with-
stand an attack by habeas corpus. 2 In the State of Washington
a child thought to be a juvenile delinquent may not be taken into
custody and detained without a complaint being filed. 3 Upon
this point, however, there was a vigorous dissent on the ground
that a complaint should be necessary to sustain a commitment,
but not mere custody by the juvenile court for the purpose of
questioning, since the proceeding is not in any sense criminal in
nature. This case is probably the exception, and is not law in
Missouri.
Thus a change to administrative action would involve little
change so far as the complaint is concerned. It depends upon
the type of administrative procedure whether or not a written
complaint is required. Many boards have the power by their
own motion to have individuals brought before them. 4
The great number of cases which are adjusted informally,
after the attention of the probation officer is brought to them,
is one very strong reason for urging the workability of a juve-
nile board rather than a court. Frequently an interview with
the child and the parties interested results in a satisfactory ad-
justment of the case. The probation officer may merely warn
the child, or he may have the child come back and report at in-
tervals for a short period. It was found that over half of the cases
are successfully disposed of in this way in St. Louis. Probably
the community in which the greatest number of cases is handled
1 State v. Johnson (1923) 196 Iowa 300, 194 N. W. 202; Lou, JUVENILE
COURTS IN THE U. S. (1927) 99.
Ex parte Guitierrez (1920) 46 Cal. App. 94, 188 Pac. 1004.
2 Weber v. Doust (1914) 81 Wash. 668, 143 Pac. 148.




in this way is Denver, where ninety per cent are so disposed of.,
It was stated by the Chief Probation Officer in St. Louis that he
considered these adjustments the most satisfactory because,
among other reasons, they prevent the child's name from get-
ting into the court records. Since this adjustment with abso-
lutely no formality whatsoever is conceded to be so valuable in
innumerable cases, there is no reason why an administrative
board could not handle all the cases on the same basis, with per-
haps a provision that a serious offender be turned over to the
criminal courts at the discretion of the chief officer of the board,
who would, of course, be specially trained for the position.
The belief that such an informal adjustment for all cases
would provide an opportunity for a child to be committed to an
institution unjustly is groundless, because the possibility of a
child being "framed" under the existing procedure is slight. If
the person complaining to the probation officer is not known to
him, the probation officer investigates the complaint to be sure
that it is not the result of spite. Such investigation is equally
feasible for an administrative board.
One way in which the juvenile court of today does not differ
greatly from a formal court is in its retention of the power to
punish for contempt. By judicial decision the juvenile court
has an inherent right to punish violations of its orders as con-
tempt.6 A number of states expressly give the court this power.
7
But most administrative authorities cannot themselves penalize
disobedience, and must invoke the aid of a court.8 If the power
is considered of sufficient importance, it could be preserved to a
juvenile board by the proper legislative action.
Under the present procedure, after a preliminary investiga-
tion has been had and a date set for the hearing, a warrant or
summons is served by the probation officer requiring the parent
or guardian to be in court with the child at the time set. A sum-
mons is less formal than a warrant in that it does not constitute
an arrest, but a failure to obey it constitutes contempt. This
warrant or summons as a general rule is necessary.9 There is
some authority to the effect that both parents are entitled to a
warrant or summons. 10 In St. Louis it is always attempted to
Lou, op. cit. 124.
U. S. v. Lattimer (1915) 44 App. D. C. 81.
'Lou, op. cit. c. 7.
'FREUND, op. cit. sec. 90; contra: Ex parte Sanford (1911) 236 Mo. 665,
139 S. W. 376.
' Karrib v. Bailey (1921) 212 Mich. 502, 180 N. W. 386. Parents waived
right to notice and hearing of proceedings, and child was at the hearing,
but summons held necessary since it was to apprise the parents of the
nature of the charge, not only to tell them the time of hearing.
Ex parte Solberg (N. D. 1925) 203 N. W. 898.
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- have both parents served, but if it is impossible to reach one
the court is conceded to have jurisdiction none the less. Parents
who attend the hearing without having had a warrant or sum-
mons cannot advance that fact later to overthrow the court's
jurisdiction." Unusual is the case that asserts that the juris-
diction of the juvenile court attaches without regard to the cita-
tion of the parent, because the latter is entitled to his day in
court to demand custody of the child.12 Of course a mere com-
mitment pending proceedings for final disposition will not be
void on its face because of lack of notice to the parents.18 If
there were a juvenile board instead of a court, the warrant and
summons would be replaced by a notice of hearing which would
not differ essentially from the present procedure. The infor-
mality of some administrative notices, as in tax assessment
cases, would not be possible, because the nature of the determi-
nation of children's cases is such that it requires personal notice
to the parties interested.
The court hearing itself is the most interesting part of the
present juvenile procedure. The statutes generally provide that
the hearings are to be informal or summary in nature and con-
ducted under such rules as the court may prescribe. The object
of the simple procedure is to prevent confusing the child's mind.
It has been held that the regular processes of law provided to
produce evidence and to aid courts in testing and weighing it
will not be disregarded in juvenile procedure."4 A short state-
ment of the cases in which this conclusion was announced will
illustrate the limitations upon the informality of proceedings in
the juvenile court. A child was declared dependent by the court
because of its mother's cruelty. Various people had told the
judge confidentially that its home was not a suitable place for it.
The parents were not allowed to be represented by counsel and
no opportunity for cross-examination was given. The decision
of commitment by the juvenile court was reversed on the ground
that only technicalities of procedure, and not rules protecting
substantive rights, could be disregarded. As an abstract con-
cept, this is beyond criticism; but in practice it is found that
courts tend to consider matters really procedural, such as rules
of evidence, as "substantive rights." An official properly
trained should be allowed great latitude in determining the facts
of the cases and should not be unduly hampered by technicalities
of procedure masquerading as privileges. The use of adminis-
In re Turner (1915) 94 Kan. 115, 145 Pac. 871.
Bleier v. Crouse (1920) 13 Ohio App. 69.
People ex rel. Riesner v. N. Y. Nursery and Child's Hospital (1920)
230 N. Y. 119, 129 N. E. 341.
" In re Hill (Cal. App. 1926) 247 Pac. 591.
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trative boards would have this advantage over the present
system.
The hearings in juvenile courts are private, and only those
interested are allowed in the court room. A public hearing can-
not be claimed as a constitutional right because there is no
prosecution for crime. On the same theory the allowance of
lawyers is not a matter of constitutional right.15 In St. Louis,
however, the parties may insist that they be represented by a
lawyer, although it is said that their insistence upon having one
is more likely to prejudice their case than help it. As a practical
matter, a lawyer is really a useless adjunct in a juvenile court
because it is the social and psychological background of the child
that is important, and not a technical argument as to its legal
rights. Since there is no right to be represented by counsel in
all administrative proceedings, it is possible that a statute pro-
viding for a juvenile board would do away with this right to be
represented by counsel which still exists in some jurisdictions.
Statutes not providing for a jury trial in children's cases have
been almost universally upheld.16 A number of states have con-
sidered it necessary to preserve the constitutional rights, if not
of the child, at least of the parent. These statutes usually pro-
vide that the child, parent or any person interested may demand
trial by a jury of six or twelve, or that the court may, on its own
motion, order it. This applies to both dependency and delin-
quency cases. A trial by a jury of six provided for by statute
has been held constitutional in Illinois,1 but unconstitutional in
Michigan.18 It has been pointed out that the service of a jury
in most juvenile court cases is largely perfunctory now because
the jury usually accept the decision of the judge as indicated by
his attitude toward the case.' 9 If it is so perfunctory, there
would be little hardship in the change to an administrative
board where there would be no jury. The abolition of a jury in
children's cases would to a great degree destroy the tendency on
the part of many juvenile courts to treat the proceeding as
criminal and the child as a criminal, when to do so is in direct
contravention to the intention behind juvenile legislation. The
method of giving jurisdiction in children's cases to criminal
courts is conceded to be bad. 20 The bare possibility of the child
'Lou, op. cit. 137.
"Bryant v. Prown (Miss. 1928) 118 So. 184; Lou, op. cii. 136.
, Lindsay v. Lindsay (1913) 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892.
"Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges (1908) 151 Mich. 315, 115 N. W. 682.
The theory of the court was that the accused in a criminal prosecution has
the right to trial by jury of twelve men.
'Lou, op. cit. 136.
"Flexner and Oppenheimer, Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Court (1922)
57 AM. L. Ru. 65.
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being considered as a criminal should be wiped out by the
change of jurisdiction to the administrative board.
The application of rules of evidence in the juvenile court has
been carried over to a rather marked extent from formal crimi-
nal procedure. A child can be found delinquent or dependent
and its parents deprived of its custody only according to the
rules of evidence.2 1 It is customary for judges in the St. Louis
Juvenile Court to rule out evidence as being in violation of the
hearsay rule even when the testimony is given by the probation
officer and appears to be good evidence. Any difference between
the allegations of delinquency and the evidence has been held
immaterial if the evidence tends in any way to show delin-
quency.22 The St. Louis Probation Officer indicated that such
variance would probably be fatal in the St. Louis Juvenile Court,
but that any chance of such variance was avoided by quoting the
statutory definition of delinquency, which is decidedly complete,
in the petition.23 An extreme case goes so far as to say that a
conviction of delinquency may be sustained although the petition
fails to charge delinquency. 24 This decision, when considered,
seems thoroughly sensible because, since the child's welfare is
the primary consideration, whatever appears on the trial should
be considered in determining what is to be done with him, and a
mere technical variance between the petition and the evidence
should be disregarded. This particular difficulty would be
largely overcome in the case of a juvenile board, because a peti-
tion could be made unnecessary by statute and the findings of
fact by the board could be made practically conclusive, as in
hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The reports of the probation officer alone are not considered
sufficient legal evidence to support a delinquency judgment.2
It is customary for the probation officer and his assistants to
make a thorough social investigation, but they also attempt to
have witnesses, complainant, parents and other interested
parties in court. Witnesses may be sworn at the discretion of
the judge, but this is seldom done in St. Louis.
It would be exceedingly advantageous in many children's cases
to ignore technical rules of evidence. Facts brought in by social
investigators should be sufficient. These, interpreted by an ad-
ministrative official qualified by study of psychiatry, should form
the basis of a very efficient proceeding.
Lou, op. cit. 138.
State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court (Wash. 1926) 245 Pac. 409.
R. S. Mo. (1919) see. 2591; amended, Mo. Laws 1923, p. 153.
Davis v. State (Tex. Crinm. App. 1930) 21 S. W. (2d) 1068.
State v. Freeman (1928) 81 Mont. 132, 262 Pac. 168.
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The right of appeal is another legal incident that has been car-
ried over into the present juvenile system. In most states special
provisions are made in the law for appeals from decisions of the
juvenile court.2  When no such provisions exist it has been held
by a number of courts that, since proceedings under juvenile
court laws are purely special and statutory, no appeal lies unless
the right is given by the state by necessary implication.27 Other
states, however, imply an appeal on the theory that parents can-
not be deprived of the custody of their children without one.28
In Texas the statute allows an appeal but sets out no provisions
governing it, and it has been held that appeals may be taken
under the usual procedure in criminal cases.29 This is another
example of the unfortunate tendency to treat the juvenile pro-
ceeding as criminal. In Tennessee the appellate jurisdiction is
invoked by certiorari and supersedeas, no right of appeal or writ
of error being provided.30 The remedy of habeas corpus is not
proper if the statute provides an appeal.31 The use of habeas
corpus is further limited in that it does not lie after commitment
on the ground of irregularities in the trial, but only for want ofjurisdiction in the court which rendered the judgment.32 In lieu
of an appeal, Michigan provides for a rehearing in the juvenile
court, at which the first judge is disqualified from sitting.33
Even with a juvenile board it would be necessary to provide for
some sort of review. The present procedure in that regard
would probably be changed very little. It would be advisable to
have the general rule that an administrative board's findings of
fact are fairly conclusive, so that the judge in the higher court
would in most cases be precluded from destroying the construc-
tive work of the board.
The record which goes up on juvenile appeals is similar to
that in any ordinary case. It should include the title of the
court, the facts on which the court's jurisdiction rested, the filing
of the petition stating the facts constituting delinquency, the
violation of the specified law, or a statement that the child is
incorrigible or otherwise delinquent within the statute, and the
order committing the child to an institution. Failure to make
"R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 2610; Lou, op. cit. 139.
"Commonwealth v. Youngblut (1914) 159 Ky. 87, 166 S. W. 808; State
v. Zenzen (Minn. 1929) 227 N. W. 356.
"In re Farnsworth (Idaho 1928) 266 Pac. 421.
Ex parte Brooks (1919) 85 Tex. Crim. 252, 211 S. W. 592.
"State v. Bockman (1918) 139 Tenn. 432, 201 S. W. 741.
"Stoker v. Gowans (1915) 45 Utah 556, 147 Pac. 991; Hill v. Pierce
(1924) 113 Ore. 386, 231 Pac. 652.
"In re Wolff (1920) 183 Cal. 602, 192 Pac. 33; McDonald v. Short (1921)
190 Ind. 388, 130 N. E. 536.
, Lou, op. cit. 139.
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findings of fact upon which the court may exercise its jurisdic-
tion as a foundation for judgment is usually held to require re-
versal.34  More liberal decisions hold that, on appeal, notice to
parents or waiver of notice will be presumed," and even that
unfitness of the parent is to be presumed from an order depriv-
ing him of custody.38 A decision that there is no presumption
as to jurisdiction in support of a judgment B: seems backward,
as the proceedings are summary in character; but this could
be remedied by a juvenile board with a jurisdiction carefully
protected by statute.
A commendable point in the present procedure is that use
cannot be made of juvenile court evidence in later trials occur-
ring after the individual has become of age.88 In some states
this is provided by statute, while in others the records kept by
the juvenile court are not subject to public inspection.
As a result of action by the juvenile court, a child may be dis-
missed, put on probation, placed in a home, or committed to
an institution. Dismissal usually occurs in informal adjustment,
or for insufficient evidence before the juvenile court itself. When
conditions do not seem to warrant probation and yet the judge
is unwilling to dismiss the case, he may continue it for a definite
or indefinite period. The case is nominally under the court'sjurisdiction and the child is in legal custody of the court, await-
ing a full hearing. The case may be again brought into court
without the necessity of filing a new petition.89 Some cases say
that once a child is committed the jurisdiction of the court is
ended.40 This ends the account of present juvenile court pro-
cedure.
There seems to be a growing current of dissatisfaction with
the procedure as it now exists. It appears that there are two
schools of thought on the question, one contending that the
children's cases should be handled in a general court of domestic
relations, and the other that the more progressive tendency to-
ward administrative action be followed. Protagonists of the
former school feel that the determination of children's cases
can never be completely divorced from legal rights and obliga-
tions. 41 Typical of their convictions is the desire to keep the
In re Hill (Cal. App. 1926) 247 Pac. 591.
Gordon v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) 228 S. W. 1095.
Matter of Cannon (1915) 27 Cal. App. 549, 150 Pac. 867.
Kelsey v. Carroll (1913) 22 Wyo. 85, 138 Pac. 867.
Kozler v. N. Y. Telephone Co. (1919) 93 N. J. 279, 108 Atl. 375.
Lou, op. cit. 145.
'Board of Children's Guardians v. Juvenile Court (1915) 43 App. D. C.
599; Board of Control of State Home v. Mulertz (1916) 60 Colo. 468, 154
Pac. 742.
" Flexner and Oppenheimer, op. cit. supra n. 20.
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right of trial by jury inviolate. In marked contrast is the feel-
ing that duties of investigation, complaint, obtaining evidence,
trial, adjudication, sentence, supervision, punishment and pro-
bation are too inconsistent with each other to be placed in any
one agency; that correction and reformation of incorrigible
children is not a judicial function. The court is a tribunal for
the judicial determination of facts at issue. It would take more
than human ingenuity to harmonize the administrative function
of correction with the judicial function of a court, in one institu-
tion.2 A former judge of the Juvenile Court of Cincinnati ob-
serves that about ninety per cent of the juvenile courts fail to
avail themselves of the services of the psychologist and psychia-
trist and modern facilities for diagnosis and prognosis because
the judges have proceeded on the assumption that the child is a
juvenile criminal and subject to trial and punishment. No as-
sumption could be more opposed to the modern sense of justice.
The belief is current among the more advanced social workers
that the work of the juvenile court will ultimately be merged
into that of the administrative institutions of the community.43
An administrative board created by careful legislation, headed
by those who by experience and training would be in a position
to handle children's cases well, seems a logical solution to the
problems of the present system. The juvenile court is an
anomaly; administrative action may be the cure.
GLADYS ERNA STAMM, '31.
Herbert Baker, Passing of the Juvenile Court, THE SURVEy, vol. XLV,
p. 705, Feb. 12, 1921.
'Charles Hoffman, Saving the Child, THE SURVEY, vol. XLV, p. 704,
Feb. 12, 1921.
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